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The Undergrad’s Dilemma: 
n-Person Games and Information Asymmetry in 
Undergraduate Course Selection 
 
Michael A. Verlezza 
3 December, 2013 
 
Abstract: 
In 2012, the White House released its College Scorecards for institutions of higher education.  In 
their overview, the White House states that Bridgewater State University in Bridgewater, MA, 
has a six-year graduation rate of just 51.7 percent.  By approaching the question of low 
graduation rates as a consequence of economic inefficiency, my research led me to treat 
undergraduate course selection as a Nash n-person game.  From there, my investigation led to an 
analysis of information asymmetry as I attempted to identify the various internal and external 
information sources driving course selection.  Specific attention was given to Bridgewater 
State’s internal system, Infobear, which was held alongside the external professor evaluation site 
RateMyProfessors.com.  The data was analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares regression 
models.  Ultimately, I propose a solution to help maximize utility, which I refer to as Involuntary 
Equilibrium, which holds the potential to create a novel relationship between the institution and 
the student while maximizing aggregate societal utility.  
Acknowledgements:  
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Economics Department.  His assistance and guidance has proven invaluable.  Moreover, this 
paper would have been impossible without the ongoing assistance of Honors Program 
Administrator Amy Couto and Program Director Dr. Teresa King.  I have also benefitted 
tremendously from the insights of my wife, Alice, who has consistently helped me evaluate, 
defend, refine, and reinforce my ideas. 
THE UNDERGRAD’S DILEMMA  3 
 
I. Competitive Forces: A Keynesian Approach to Course Selection 
 
In his landmark work The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, John 
Maynard Keynes introduces a concept familiar to many but entirely understood by few.  Supply 
and demand curves are plotted along two axes, typically labeled “price” along the vertical axis 
and “quantity” along the horizontal one.  While the graph in The General Theory is used to 
describe interest rate effects of changes to the money supply, it is useful to use the graph to 
explain an array of economic phenomenon (1936). 
 
The Supply of Education 
 
In an economic sense, this paper treats the “supply of education” as the quantity of classes 
offered in a particular subject, but a more specific approach – treating every individual seat in 
each separate course – is a viable alternative, particularly when investigating the issue of course 
selection from an individual perspective.  At the larger institutional level, it is more sensible to 
take the class-by-class approach.  Over the course of this paper, various scenarios will call for a 
course-level approach, a seat-based approach, or a combination of the two. 
  
It is important to establish a few assumptions.  Firstly, it is important to establish that 
individuals are intrinsically selfish (250 years of economic thinking speaks to the power of 
rational self-interest).  It is also important to acknowledge that seats in a class are effectively 
private goods – they are both rivalrous and excludable.  Rivalrous goods are those goods that 
their consumption by one person precludes the consumption of the same good by another.  
Excludability is the notion that people cannot access a specific good without incurring some cost.  
The finite nature of seats or classes offered ensures the logical underpinnings of these 
assumptions. 
 
Stemming from these assumptions are a few key observations.  First, students will follow a 
selfish path through their degree programs, seeking to optimize their own well-being through 
course selection and continued enrollment.  Second, the finite number of seats and classes creates 
competition (for a preferred professor, a particular course, and a specific time for an offering).  
Third, this competition creates winners and losers in the higher education system. 
 
The answer, however, is not an increase in supply – neither in the form of additional seats or 
additional course selections.  Braess’ Paradox tells us that merely adding additional capacity will 
reduce overall performance across the system.  This will have systemic implications as the 
additional choice creates added confusion, a scenario only avoidable if the system was in Nash 
Equilibrium to begin with.  Braess tells us that students perceiving an easier path will flock to the 
new alternatives, while others vacillate between offerings.  It has been shown that this dithering 
creates a less optimal selection strategy, which remains until Nash Equilibrium is reestablished.  
In the interim, this allocation of resources (here taking the form of seats in a course) is less than 
ideal.  Students (as has been shown to be the case in various studies involving motorists) 
continually re-rank their options, falling back reliably on rational self-interest (Braess, 2005).  
Conversely and perhaps counter-intuitively, limited selection may lead to fewer idle classroom 
resources. 
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The Demand for Education  
 
The escalating price tag of higher education over the last half decade has created an 
environment conducive to an investigation of buyer behavior.  One study in particular, has 
demonstrated the inelasticity of higher education.  Consequently, students will continue to 
purchase higher education without regard to increasing costs (Rivera, 2012). 
 
Historically, the understanding was that cultural and familial mores were a powerful 
motivator driving the demand for higher education.  While there is indeed a social component, 
more recent analyses suggest that the biggest driver of continued pursuit (or return to) higher 
education comes from a student’s peer group.  In their 1965 analysis, McDill and Coleman 
evaluated the various factors that drove college enrollment.  To their surprise, while familial 
influences (educational attainment of previous generations, parental income, etc.) were a factor, 
they were not nearly as influential as initially assumed.  In their model, the variable with the 
most explanatory power was social standing – peer pressure in common parlance.  For McDill 
and Coleman, high school students entering college are doing so simply in an effort to “keep up 
with the Joneses.”  
 
There is also the widespread expectation that higher levels of educational attainment drive 
higher income potential later in life.  David Card’s comprehensive work on the subject brings the 
relationship between years of education and income into clear focus.  His 1999 paper 
demonstrates that the relationship is essentially logarithmic in nature.  On balance, more 
schooling does in fact lead to higher mean wages.  By looking at earners between the ages of 40 
and 45, Carr is able to account for people with decades in the workforce, avoiding any biases that 
might arise from institutional prestige or underpaid entry-level work. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Relationship between mean log hourly wages and completed education (Card, 1999). 
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When held against data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013), Card’s research lays plain the 
relationship between educational attainment and income potential, and those with a college 
education will fare far better than their less-well educated peers. 
 
Other Economic Considerations 
 
In May of 1991, the entire Ivy League, along with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
faced a complaint from the Justice Department regarding the manner in which they set tuition 
prices.  All but one school named in the action (MIT) settled the complaint.  In response, the 
Justice Department was forced to issue a decree specifically “preventing…schools from jointly 
fixing tuition or financial aid awards or and from exchanging financial aid information on 
admitted applicants” (Morrison, 1992).  Knowing that this was a common practice going back to 
at least the 1980s, it is impossible to discuss the economics of higher education without at least a 
cursory treatment of cartel pricing. 
 
Cartel pricing stems from the notion that a group of ostensible competitors would agree, 
formally or informally, to set market prices for their product.  In the case of the Ivy League and 
MIT, this took the form of tuition and financial aid packages, ensuring the cartel could ensure 
abnormal financial gains for themselves while extracting value from students.  Collusion was 
simple in the Ivy League due the small number of firms involved, but in the present regulatory 
environment and in a nation that boasts hundreds of colleges and universities, cartel pricing of 
higher education on a larger scale would verge on the impossible.   
 
It may go without saying, though, that institutions of higher education have the monopoly on 
higher education.  That said, schools are not perfect substitutes for one another, creating an 
environment of oligopoly.  While the Cournot-Nash model of oligopoly is the simplest, it is 
perhaps not the most appropriate, given the dominant nature of prestige institutions in various 
parts of the country.  With a Dominant Firm model, there is a single firm (or handful of firms) 
that control the market, be it through product differentiation, branding, or other aspects.  As a 
result, the entire market follows the pricing model of the dominant firm.  In the Boston area, it 
would be hard to argue that the dominant firm is Harvard.  In this instance, reality closely 
follows economic theory.  According to data from the Provosts of both Harvard and Bridgewater 
State University, Harvard tuition (in nominal dollars) has gone from $13,085 in 1990 to $33,656 
in 2010, while Bridgewater State tuition has gone from $1,788 $6,603 over the same time period.  
By increasing their prices so dramatically over the previous two decades, other universities in the 
area have been forced to keep pace.  This demonstrates the dominant firm oligopolistic model 
and explains rising prices across the board.   
 
In this introductory and admittedly high-level analysis, it would seem that students and their 
peer groups are not the only entities trying to “keep up with the Joneses.”  Interestingly, higher 
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II. Strategic Course Selection – A Game Nobody Really Wins? 
  
Having established the underlying economic forces at the core of higher education, it is 
possible to begin an investigation as to how students end up in various courses.  Anecdotally, it 
has been suggested by students themselves that rarely is a semester comprised of an ideal 
combination of courses, times, and professors.  This is attributable to a variety of forces, and this 
section will approach the problem from a trio of more advanced economic concepts, from which 
I derive an additional explanatory economic construct.  It is important to introduce three more 
advanced mechanics in order to arrive at the fourth.  With these additional mechanics in place, 





In his seminal work, Non-Cooperative Games, John Forbes Nash improved on existing zero-
sum game theory originally introduced by John von Neumann.  By treating individuals as 
competitors rather than parties in collusion, Nash assumed “that each participant acts 
independently, without collaboration or communication” (1950).  For the purposes of this 
analysis, we can treat individual students as competitors in a zero-sum, non-cooperative n-person 
game.  Nash’s work dictates that there is an ideal outcome whereby in a finite system such as a 
college registration environment, there is an equilibrium point at which every member of the 
community enjoys the best possible outcome (within the constraints of said system).  The 
underlying mathematics that Nash uses to establish that equilibrium point is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  Nonetheless, it is important to start with the assumption that there exists an ideal 
scenario whereby everyone in the system, in a manner of speaking, “wins.” 
  
In practice, however, Nash’s model is insufficient.  Consider a binary state whereby two 
competing parties employ strategies i and j in an effort to build the ideal schedule.  Nash’s model 
would suggest that an equilibrium point exists at the intersection of the two strategies, whereby 
both parties (students) would get everything they want.  While Nash Equilibrium would suggest 
academic harmony, it is rarely practical in the typical course registration setting.  Frequently, 
students get a mixed bag consisting of some combination of ideal courses and other, less useful 
options.  Thus, Nash’s model requires two substantial modifications: the presence of strategic 
dominance and intransivity.   
 
In the case of strategic dominance, assume students Alice and Bob are employing strategies i 
and j in order to build their ideal schedule.  In the case of course registration, strategy can be 
defined as the courses needed to maintain full time enrollment, progress within a major, 
complete prerequisites, etc.  The problem arises from the competitive nature of course 
registration and the rivalrous, excludable nature of the good being sought.  Nash’s original 
mathematical model incorporates the competitive and non-collaborative nature of these 
processes, but overlooks the notion that there exists a strategy i which will always yield a 
superior result.  Moreover, while our example has a binary state of two students employing only 
two distinct strategies, in reality there are as many different strategies as there are students.  In 
the context of course registration, strategic advantage will most typically arise from two factors – 
priority registration and academic standing.   
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The consequence of prioritized registration leads to a second requisite modification to Nash’s 
original insights.  Intransivity, in economic terms, refers to an individual acting in a manner 
inconsistent with their self-interest.  In our game of course registration, we can think of this as 
Alice or Bob self-assigning (effectively relegating) themselves to inferior strategy j.  In practice, 
we see this frequently among the population of underclassmen, who are forced to enroll in 
courses that are not necessarily their first choice, either for one or for an array of reasons.  As 
this paper will go on to demonstrate at the end of this section, it is possible to employ set theory 
to express the effects of strategic dominance and intransivity within the context of n-person 
games.  Later still, we will see a modified model with the potential to incorporate not only 
individual preferences and the natural “pecking order” of undergraduate registration, but also the 




Treating course registration as a competitive n-person game as we are, any discussion would 
be incomplete without the incorporation of information asymmetry.  The notion was originally 
introduced by the economist Joseph Stiglitz in his 1992 paper, in which Stiglitz suggests that 
information is a critical component of any economic system.  Specifically, his paper dealt with 
the implications of imbalanced information between buyers and sellers in credit markets, but the 
economic tools he introduced can easily be scaled down and applied to microeconomic decision-
making.   
 
In virtually any exchange, there is an unbalanced relationship between knowledge held by the 
seller and the knowledge held by the buyer.  In the case of higher education, the under-informed 
buyer is clearly the student, while the school (or more specifically, faculty and staff) maintain a 
more solid understanding of institutional policies and academic requirements.  In our n-person 
game where there existed strategies i and j, the problem arises when neither of our students 
(Alice and Bob) truly understand all the variables that may affect their decisions, and thus cannot 
adequately account for them strategically.    
 
To remedy the gap, students seek sources of external information.  This can be problematic 
for a variety of reasons, because as Stiglitz tells us, not only are the cost of accumulating 
additional information is increasingly expensive, but delivers marginal benefit at a decreasing 
rate.  The dynamic is further complicated by the realities of navigating the world of higher 
education for undergraduates – reliable information is only occasionally gleaned.  The possibility 
of a student developing a given strategy which will actually engender maximum utility when that 
strategy is predicated on inaccurate or incomplete information creates problems for our n-person 
game.  Fundamental concepts in information economics tell us that information may be easy to 
create but is virtually impossible to verify.  The consequence for students is strategy rife with 
error – a scenario that leads to intransivity. 
  
As a way to demonstrate the dangers of external information sources, the econometric 
component of this paper will examine the relationship between enrollment and one specific 
external source of information, the infamous ratings website RateMyProfessors.com.  While 
additional detail follows below, it is worthy of note here that in our n-person game, the 
relationship between enrollment in a specific course having m-tuple parameters is statistically 
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significant, suggesting that students may, in reality, be predicating their course selection 




The Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto originally applied his understanding of resource 
allocation to income distribution.  Like Nash’s strides in game theory and Stiglitz’s introduction 
of information asymmetry, Pareto Optimality (frequently referred to interchangeably as Pareto 
Efficiency) can be couched in terms of higher education.  In fact, it is perhaps the easiest of the 
three to see at work at a university, as Pareto Efficiency deals specifically with microeconomic 
outcomes – in short, Pareto Efficiency exists when no one party can be made better off without 
making another party worse of (Barr, 2012). 
 
Optimization under Pareto Efficiency is predicated on a pre-existing allocation of goods.  
Typically this is done randomly or treated as a given for the purposes of economic modeling.  In 
higher education, this would be equivalent to enrolling every student in a full roster of randomly 
assigned classes.  From there, Pareto Improvement takes place as members of the undergraduate 
community exchange seats in various classes to more closely align their realized schedule with 
their established strategy.  While such a mechanic is impractical, it does demonstrate the viability 
of Pareto’s optimal distribution of resources, and ultimately, how it aligns with Nash’s notions of 
equilibrium. 
  
The difference between equilibrium states for Pareto and Nash, however, is that Pareto’s 
scheme is predicated on a good-faith exchange of resources amongst participants in the system.  
While it’s true that a form of equilibrium state emerges, that state would be dominated by 
students with a handful of desirable classes (and likely one or two courses they would rather not 
take, or have no use for).  From the perspective of the student, this outcome is anything but 
efficient, even though it aligns with Pareto’s understanding of optimal outcomes.  Because of the 
finite number of seats and finite number of classes, it becomes impossible for any one student to 
improve their lot without doing so at the expense of another student.  To complicate matters, the 
risk of aggregate disutility and inefficiency grows exponentially with every additional member of 
the academic community. 
 
While institutions do not assign courses with various parameters randomly, the implications 
of a system predicated entirely on Nash or Pareto is clear, particularly in light of the costs 
associated with information gathering on the demand side.  Consequently, the traditional 
institutional model of offering several hundred different courses having various attributes then 
leaving students to sort out the mess is a broken paradigm.  It is a relic.  It is an artifact of a 
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Let S denote the range of all student strategies. 
 Let s denote an individual strategy such that: 
 s ∈ S. 
Let U denote the range of all possible utility outcomes. 
 Let u denote an individual utility outcome such that  
 u ∈ U. 
Let i and j be individual students having course selection strategies si and sj. 
 ∀S, (si ≠ sj) ⇾ (ui ≠ uj) 
 ∴ (ui + uj + … + un) < Umax 
for n number of students. 
 
Equation 1 -  Mathematical Model of Existing Course Selection Strategy 
 
III. Involuntary Equilibrium 
 
By synthesizing an analysis of strategy and outcomes in n-person games, the effects of and 
student reliance upon asymmetric information, along with the concept of Pareto Optimality, it is 
clear that a group of competitors (read as: students) cannot be reasonably expected to arrive at an 
equilibrium state where every party engaged is maximizing their economic well-being.  When 
we factor in the costs of higher education and the societal ramifications of this waste, a need 
arises for a new economic concept.  From this need, I have developed the concept of Involuntary 
Equilibrium. 
  
From a macroeconomic perspective, the effects (and practicality) of a planned economy is 
well understood (Mandel, 1986).  What is lacking is a treatment of how such a macroeconomic 
construct could be applied to higher education in a way that not only maximizes individual well-
being but also the aggregate social benefit of a more educated population.  It is clear from the 
preceding analysis that the traditional free-for-all approach allocating a critical rivalrous and 
excludable good is insufficient.  
 
Ultimately we can identify that the state (in this case, the state takes the form of a university 
or other institution) must step in and regulate who takes what when, working on behalf of the 
students and broader society to establish what, from the student’s perspective, can be referred to 
as Involuntary Equilibrium.   
 
Consider the foregoing economic concepts.  Nash suggests that if left to their own devices, 
an equilibrium state will emerge amongst students whereby every competitor will get some of 
what they want, yet by definition something somehow something less.  The problem with Nash’s 
model is analogous to the issues that arise with Pareto’s: that what is systematically efficient is a 
far cry from what is ideal for the individual, and by extension, society.  The implications of 
Stiglitz’s insights create a multiplicative effect for the deficiencies left behind by Nash and 
Pareto.  On average, students looking to ameliorate their standing within the n-person game 
cannot.  This is the very definition of the zero-sum game.  
 
Revisiting again the n-person game, we identify that the institution already establishes the 
framework by which students select courses and the mechanic by which they enroll in them.  
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Thus, the institution controls the parameters which would define Nash’s equations.  This in turn 
removes the gamesmanship that arises from various attempts by students to derive a given 
strategy.  Were an institution to offer a sufficient m-tuple combination of possible schedules and 
take the decision-making process out of students’ hands, the institution has the potential to 
maximize the efficient use of academic resources.  In so doing, the institution ensures that each 
individual student has the ideal combination of courses having m-tuple attributes.   
 
In conclusion, if we treat the academic institution as a firm, we see that by maximizing the 
individual benefits of their customers the firm itself holds wasted resources to a minimum.  
Second, since we are speaking in terms of higher education, and the benefits of a more educated 
population (workforce) have been exhaustively analyzed and demonstrated (Judy and D’Amico, 
2006), the institution maximizes the broader benefit to society.  From these two realizations 
stems an important observation – Involuntary Equilibrium allows a public institution to fulfill 
their societal mandate by creating the most educated and capable population possible. 
 
Let S denote the range of all student strategies. 
 Let s denote an individual strategy, 
Let B denote a global (or institutional) strategy such that: 
 s ∈ S ∈ B. 
Let U denote the range of all possible utility outcomes. 
 Let u denote an individual utility outcome such that  
 u ∈ U. 
Let i and j be individual students having course selection strategies si and sj. 
 ∃B, (∀S, (si = sj) ⇾ (ui = uj) ⇾ ∑ (  
 
 
 = Umax 
 ∴ (ui + uj + … + un) = Umax 
for n number of students. 
Equation 2- Mathematical Model of Course Selection Strategy Under Involuntary Equilibrium 
 




As economics is the science of allocating limited resources to address unlimited wants, this 
paper has, thus far, been a treatment for fitting a virtually infinite number of possible student 
schedules into a finite quantity of class seats.  The econometric component of this paper will 
inform our understanding of the relationship between various administrative inputs (which take 
the form of course attributes) as well as external information.  In so doing, quantitative analysis 
will yield policy insights and demonstrate the viability of a registration system predicated on 











The quantitative component of this study focuses on various aspects of undergraduate course 
selection, specifically how assorted course attributes affect enrollment in a given course.  If the 
aim is to allocate classroom resources in the most efficient way possible, such an analysis will 
provide insights in light of asymmetric information, but also point to the different drivers that 
contribute to undergraduate course selection.  Various null hypotheses are stated expressed 
below: 
 
H1: Students do not rely on external information sources prior to enrolling in courses.  As 
a result, the coefficients for NOOFRANKINGS, RMPOVRALL, and RMPEASY will be 
zero. 
 
H2: Web or web hybrid courses are not in higher demand than traditional lecture settings.  
Consequently, the coefficient for DHYBRIDWEB will be zero. 
  
H3: Junior- and Senior-level are not in higher demand.  Thus, the coefficient for 
DUPPER will be zero. 
  
H4: Economics courses required for business majors are not in higher demand.  As a 
result, the coefficient for DCROSSLIST will be zero. 
 
H5: Economics courses that satisfy a Core Curriculum requirement are not in higher 
demand.  Therefore, the coefficient for DCORE will be zero. 
 
H6: Economics courses required for the Economics major are not in higher demand.  As a 
result, the coefficient for DMAJOR will be zero. 
 
While not a hypothesis test in the traditional sense, attention should also be given to the mean 
of PROPENROLLED.  A mean below 1 indicates unfilled seats. 
  
Data and Methods  
 
Data has been gathered from Bridgewater State University’s own course registration and 
reporting tool, Infobear.  Using this system, it is possible to obtain registration and course data 
going back several years.  Initially, the aim of this study was to derive two distinct data sets – 
one containing all semester registration data from September 2007 to May of 2013 and a sample 
data set containing all the offerings from the Economics department for the same time period 
(Infobear, 2007-13). 
 
Since the focus of the study is undergraduate course selection, any graduate Economics 
courses were purged from the dataset.  One-off courses, such as independent studies or 
internships, were also removed, as neither is a “college course” in the traditional sense.  
Ultimately, this left the dataset with 465 observations.   
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A variable was created to represent enrollment in a specific class (labeled in the regression 
output as PROPENROLLED).  It is a simple function whose output is derived by dividing the 
number of students actively enrolled in a section of a given class by the maximum number of 
seats in said class.  When stated as a proportion, this allows the model to capture the effects of 
over- or under-subscribed sections, and provides for professorial and departmental discretion in 
the case of over-enrollment. 
 
A series of dummy variables were created from the categorical data.  The first, denoted 
DHYBRIDWEB, is used to identify if a class is a traditional lecture setting (indicated by a 0), or 
an online or hybrid offering (indicated by a 1).  The second dummy variable is DUPPER, which 
captures a course’s upper- or lower-division attribute.  Those courses having a numerical 
designation less than 300 (for example, ECON 210), are assigned a value of 0.  Those courses 
with a designation greater than or equal to 300 (for example, ECON 420), are given a dummy 
value of 1.  The third dummy variable is denoted as DCORE (such as ECON 199), where a 1 
indicates that a given course meets a Bridgewater State Core Curriculum requirement.  The final 
dummy variable is DCROSSLIST, which indicates if an Economics course is a requirement for 
students in other majors (such as ECON 315 – Money and Banking, required by all Finance 
majors, for example).  Here, 1 denotes a cross-listed class.   
 
Bridgewater State enrollment data is included in the data.  Using information from the BSU 
Factbook, it is possible to determine the number of undergraduates enrolled in business majors 
and more specifically, the quantity of declared Economics majors.  This was done to provide an 
important control.  As one would expect, a non-Economics major has no use for an upper-
division Economics class, with the exception of certain business students who are required to 
take ECON 315.  The number of students enrolled at BSU as Economics and business majors in 
a specific semester may be the dominant determinant of demand for economics courses. 
 
Data from an external information source completed the dataset.  By investigating the 
relationship between enrollment data and external information source completed the datasets, we 
are able to identify the effect, if any, of students seeking additional information sources about 
their prospective courses.  Data was culled from the external site RateMyProfessors.com, which 
allows students to evaluate their professors in several ways.  All evaluations are conducted on an 
integer interval from 0 to 5, with 5 being the best and 0 being the worst possible score.  Three 
data points were collected for every course section: the professor’s easiness score, the professor’s 
overall score, and as a control, the number of ratings a professor has received.  In certain cases, 
professors had not been evaluated by their students, in which case a value of 0 was assigned for 
all three variables.  In accordance with existing research (Tipoe, 2013), overall score is 
calculated as an average of a professors “helpfulness” rating and an evaluation of their 
instructional clarity.  Thus, RMPOVRALL captures both aspects of professorial style. 
 
A final note: ultimately professor names were removed entirely from the dataset, leaving 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables 
For all, n = 463 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
NOOFRANKINGS 
Number of rankings.  A count of RateMyProfessors.com 
ratings for a given professor. 36.3823 26.9679 0 92 
RMPOVRALL 
RateMyProfessors.com Overall rating for a given section's 
professor. 3.4116 0.7547 0 4.1 
RMPEASY 
RateMyProfessors.com Easiness rating for a given section's 
professor. 3.2181 0.9034 0 4.8 
RMPOVRALL* 
RMPEASY 
Interaction term calculated by multiplying the two previous 
variables. 11.4961 4.5460 0 19.68 
PROPENROLLED 
Active Enrollment / Seats Available in a course, 
representing the occupied proportion of total capacity. 0.8068 0.2946 0 1.44 
DHYBRIDWEB 
Dummy variable - 1 indicates a web-based or hybrid 
web/lecture course. 0.2981 0.4579 0 1 
DUPPER Dummy variable - 1 indicates an upper-division class. 0.1620 0.3688 0 1 
DCORE 
Dummy variable - 1 indicates the course meets at least one 
Core Curriculum requirement. 0.8034 0.3978 0 1 
DCROSSLIST 
Dummy variable - 1 indicates an Economics class required 
by non-Economics degree programs. 0.7970 0.4027 0 1 
DMAJOR 
Dummy variable – 1 indicates an Economics class that is a 
requirement for the Economics major. 0.8056 0.3612 0 1 
BUSENROLLED 
Number of students with declared majors in the College of 
Business for a given year. 1562.75 57.7479 1475 1639 
ECONENROLLED Number of declared Economics majors for a given year. 58.3585 11.7676 43 72 
 
The data was analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares regression in Stata.  Evaluating time 
series data with OLS is not typically undertaken without substantial adjustments (Wooldridge, 
2012).  However, the manner in which the dataset has been constructed ensures that the 
regressions that follow utilize cross-sectional data.  This paper is not investigating departmental 
enrollment numbers over time, but rather the various factors that drive enrollment in a given 
course section.  While it is true that the dataset culls information from several semesters, OLS 
remains a viable analytical tool because of the nature of this study.  
As we are dealing with cross-sectional data, it is important to test for multicollinearity before 
analyzing the model.  While some multicollinearity does exist in the models, cross-sectional data 
devoid of any collinearity is exceptionally rare.  Despite a scattering of fairly high collinear 
relationships, we are nevertheless satisfied that this condition of Gauss-Markov is met.  
Additionally, robust standard errors were utilized in every model to account for 
heteroskedasticity.  Robust standard errors were chosen because initially a Breusch-Pagan test 
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Table 2 - OLS Estimates of Independent Variables on Course Enrollment 
 
Dependent Variable: PROPENROLLED    
Variable Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: 
NOOFRANKINGS -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001  
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
RMPOVRALL 0.0180 -0.0014 0.0050 0.0023 0.0085 
 
(0.0259) (0.0337) (0.0257) (0.0261) (0.0298) 
RMPEASY 0.0620*** 0.0221 0.0656*** 0.0765*** 0.0764*** 
 
(0.0216) (0.0408) (0.0219) (0.0212) (0.0233) 
RMPEASY*RMPOVRALL - 0.0112 - - - 
 - (0.0102) - - - 
DHYBRIDWEB 0.0531* 0.0467 0.0670** - - 
 
(0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0306) - - 
DUPPER -0.2854** -0.2849** -0.2861** 0.0494 - 
 
(0.1144) (0.1134) (0.1133) (0.0441) - 
DCORE 0.1719** 0.1718** 0.1775** 0.3123*** - 
 
(0.0841) (0.0833) (0.0841) (0.0509) - 
DCROSSLIST 0.1287* 0.1326** 0.1250* - - 
 
(0.0676) (0.0672) (0.0677) - - 
DMAJOR -0.2836*** -0.2880*** -0.2887*** - - 
 (0.0744) (0.0736) (0.0727) - - 
BUSENROLLED 0.0001 0.0001 - - 0.0001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) - - (0.0004) 
ECONENROLLED 0.0026 0.0026 - - 0.0028 
 
(0.0018) (0.0018) - - (0.0020) 
Constant 0.3078 0.3909 0.6019*** 0.3101*** 0.1957 
 
(0.5302) (0.5296) (0.0981) (0.0574) (0.5619) 
N 463 463 463 463 463 
R-Squared 0.2350 0.2370 0.2226 0.1938 0.0766 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust Standard Errors are shown in parenthesis 
* Indicates significance at the 0.1 level 
** Indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
*** Indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
Interpretation of Results 
Using Model 1, we reject H1, because of the statistical significance and non-zero coefficient 
for RMPEASY.  As it turns out, a one point increase in a professor’s perceived easiness results 
in a six percent increase in enrollment in their class.  This relationship clearly suggests that 
students are not only seeking outside information, but that they appear to be acting based on that 
information, further suggesting external information’s role in the formulation of course selection 
strategy. 
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Note too that when we introduce an interaction variable in Model 2, we see that all four 
dummy variables remain statistically significant.  While DHYBRIDWEB is only marginally 
significant, this model has substantial implications for H2, H3, and H4.  We reject H2, which 
suggests that there is increased demand for web and web-hybrid courses. 
The null is rejected for H3.  This is because DUPPER is statistically significantly different 
from zero in every model in which it is included.  The coefficient for DUPPER is negative, 
indicating an upper-level class lowers the likelihood of filling the seats in the class. 
The null is rejected for H4.  DCROSSLIST is highly significant, and the positive coefficients 
suggest that students from the College of Business are demanding the Economics courses 
required for their majors.  This is an unsurprising result. 
The null is also rejected for H5.  The positive coefficients for DCORE indicate that 
Economics courses which satisfy a component of the Bridgewater State Core Curriculum are in 
higher demand.  The null is also rejected for H6 because of the non-zero coefficients for 
DMAJOR. 
When taken as a whole, the various models suggest that if left to the information freely and 
readily available from the institution, students will develop strategies predicated on this 
information. 
The array of nulls is rejected, and along with the persistent statistical significance of the 
dummy variables, we see how institutional information is closely tied to course enrollment.  
While correlation is not causation, the models seem to suggest that data from internal 
information sources is extremely important in undergraduate course selection, which only further 
stresses the importance of the institution’s role in student strategy formulation and enrollment 
decisions. 
Additional Commentary on Regression Results 
Students in the business school are required to take a set of introductory Economics classes, 
specifically micro- and macroeconomics, as well as statistics.  One would expect the number of 
business students to drive enrollment in these offerings.  This draws our attention to Model 1, 
where a counter-intuitive relationship exists.  Here, DCROSSLIST is statistically significant, but 
the size of the College of Business is not.  One would expect that as the College has grown, so 
too would demand in these cross-listed classes, but neither ECONENROLLED nor 
BUSENROLLED were statistically significant in any model in which they were included.  
Model 1 suggests that external information sources are more responsible for the variability of 
course enrollment numbers.  A dataset with semester-by-semester enrollment values for majors 
rather than yearly would likely improve the relationship and result in statistical significance.  
Models 1, 2 and 3 also call attention to the desirability of web and hybrid courses.  Two 
distinct models show that DHYBRIDWEB having positive coefficients and statistical 
significance.  This has clear policy implications: students are demanding web and web hybrid 
courses higher rates than traditional lecture settings.  
Another important relationship exists between a course’s core attribute and enrollment 
numbers.  Recall the definition of DCORE: a value 1 indicates that a course meets a Core 
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Curriculum requirement.  From the regression results we see that students are demanding 
Economics courses that satisfy Core Curriculum requirements.  Interestingly, these are the same 
classes many business majors are required to take – the two introductory micro- and 
macroeconomics classes as well as statistics.  Unfortunately, these data do not incorporate total 
University enrollment, leading to the possibility that the larger pool of potential students is 
demanding these classes.  This omission may also account for the relatively low R-Squared 
values seen across the various models.   
An analysis of DCORE leads naturally to an investigation into the effects of the DUPPER, 
the upper- or lower-division dummy variable.  DUPPER was statistically significant in three 
separate models.  One might expect ECONENROLLED to adopt some of this relationship in 
Model 5, but interestingly ECONENROLLED was not found to be statistically significant, even 
with fewer regressors in play.  The population of students demanding junior- and senior-level 
Economics classes is far smaller than the population that would demand freshman- and 
sophomore-level courses, so the results for DUPPER are somewhat intuitive.  The relationship 
between DUPPER and PROPENROLLED also underscores the rational dynamics at work 
behind course selection and strategy development. 
Note that DMAJOR is also statistically significant, but it is negative.  Since DMAJOR 
represents whether a class satisfies an Economics major requirement, one would expect its effect 
on PROPENROLLED to be positive.  Based on this result, it is possible that the models are 
failing to control for some other independent variable.  A potential remedy is outlined under 
Next Steps. 
The statistically significant variable that presents the most problematic case against the status 
quo is RMPEASY.  In Model 1, it is not only statistically significant, but has a relatively sizable 
coefficient when held against the institutionally-provided dummy variables.  A professor’s 
perceived easiness accounted for six percent of the variability in class enrollment.  A recent 
investigation from the University of California at Berkeley suggests that online ratings by 
students and internal institutional evaluations of faculty are fairly consistent with one another 
(Tipoe, 2013), and that the informal evaluations are rarely retaliatory or grade-related.  Tipoe’s 
work speaks to the logical validity of predicating course selection strategy on external 
information sources.   
The implication for this study is the realization that students are not only using a synthesis of 
internal and external information, but that they assign varying degrees of credibility to different 
pieces of information, even if that information comes from the same source (hence the 
significance of RMPEASY but not RMPOVRALL).  This underscores a central problem in 
information economics: information is easily created but difficult to verify and act reliably upon.  
Consider that this paper only investigates two data points from one external source.  When the 
individual considers an array of external information sources of varying quality, it is ultimately 
next to impossible for the student to derive an optimal strategy or ideal enrollment outcome. 
Conclusions and Next Steps 
The models above have a few noteworthy limitations, further encouraging the pursuit of 
future research into the area of undergraduate course selection, particularly as an analogue for 
microeconomic strategy formulation and the maximization of societal utility. 
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Most notably, the low R-Squared suggests there are additional forces at work when students 
select undergraduate classes.  Two notable omissions in this model include the total 
undergraduate enrollment numbers as well as course location.  While the former may contribute 
considerably to the variation in enrollment, the time at which a course is offered is a critical 
component in terms of consumer choice.  While it’s true that each has the potential to 
significantly increase the explanatory power of the model, additional regressors carry with them 
the risk of misrepresenting the significance of existing variables.  Future projects should 
investigate the effects of competing demands for students’ time, notably standing professional, 
familial, or personal obligations. 
Another noteworthy omission within the model is its inability to account for the comments 
section of RateMyProfessors.com.  This is qualitative data, and would be impossible to 
accurately quantify without making outrageous and likely inconsistent assumptions.  The 
problem with this omission is that students evaluating professors on RateMyProfessors.com are 
able to provide comments, which despite the quantitative scale ranging from zero to five, may 
dramatically impact a user’s interpretation of the professor’s desirability.  Consider the case 
where a professor is given an overall rating of 5 and an easiness rating of 2.  The comments 
section of the website may include details about assignments, lecture style, the frequency of 
tests, or worse, ad hominem attacks.  As a consequence, the quantitative component of this study 
may not fully capture the effect that the ratings have on professorial desirability (Baldwin and 
Blatner, 2003). 
A final problematic result is the negative coefficients for DMAJOR.  One proposed solution 
would incorporate a new variable that quantifies how many sections of a given course are offered 
each semester, rather than list every offering individually.  To be executed appropriately, future 
research should consider all the various permutations that the five dummy variables can take on, 
and determine how many sections with those attributes are offered.  When organizing and 
evaluating the data in this method, one would expect the coefficient to become positive while 
DMAJOR remains highly statistically significant.  
It has been shown, however, that students rely on external information sources when 
deciding on courses, which has ramifications for institutional academic advising processes.  
Clearly, there is an information gap between buyers and sellers of education, and it is incumbent 
upon the university to ameliorate this imbalance. 
Other conclusions arise from the statistical significance of the various dummy variables.  
Because students are obligated to attend courses that satisfy certain Core Curriculum 
requirements, it is again incumbent upon the school to ensure such offerings exist in satisfactory 
quantities.  The data also indicates that the Economics program (and overall enrollment in the 
College of Business) is growing.  To that end, it is critical that the school looks to align the 
supply of courses (and seats within said courses) with growing demand.  Furthermore, the 
absence of class location data within the Infobear registration system creates confusion, barring 
students from incorporating location preference into their course selection strategy. 
If future research is able to account for this missing information, or somehow quantify the 
comments section of RateMyProfessors.com, one might find a significantly higher R-Squared in 
future iterations of this model. 
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V. Involuntary Equilibrium and Proposed Policy Action 
 
The regression analysis confirms what the field of Economics has demonstrated repeatedly 
over the years: that a variety of consumer tastes and preferences factor into course selection.  The 
low R-Squared of the regression model indicates that there are still more preferences that have 
not been captured in this particular study.  Nonetheless, enough data exists to demonstrate the 
economic imperatives from which the notion of Involuntary Equilibrium is derived. 
It has also been shown through the investigations in previous sections that the state of Nash 
Equilibrium leaves every participant in the n-person game with a mixed bag of courses.  This 
mixed bag yields a certain amount of utility, but in an amount significantly less than the 
maximum potential utility.  Another significant observation is that individual utility derived from 
such a system will never equal the utility derived by another student, thus the system is not only 
inherently unfair, it is grossly inefficient. 
The regression analysis also demonstrated that students do in fact rely on external 
information sources when selecting classes.  While the econometric model does not (and in fact 
cannot) capture all influences of external information on consumer choice, it can (and does) 
inform development of an institutional structure inspired by models of a planned economy. 
Finally, the econometric model, by its very nature, illustrates there are a finite number of 
options available to students in a given semester.  For economic purposes, we can treat the 
various combinations of courses as a Pareto Frontier.  This too should inform the development of 
any administrative or institutional model whereby the Pareto Frontier is shifted outward, 
reflecting increased utility across the system.  
Systemic Modifications in the Short Run 
As touched upon in Section IV, one glaring deficiency in the existing Bridgewater State 
University system is a course registration system, Infobear, which does not provide class location 
information to students prior to course selection. This is an artifact of an administrative system 
that does not assign classrooms to courses until registration has been completed.  While the 
impetus behind this policy decision may be noble (having to do with disabled access to certain 
facilities, for example), it serves as a barrier that prevents the typical student from making a more 
fully informed choice.  The consequence of this missing information is a significant source of 
disutility not only for students, but also for the surrounding community as throngs of students 
move from building to building during passing time.  Bridgewater State’s traffic issues are well 
documented (Carboneau, 2013), but from an economic standpoint, an ill-informed student cannot 
possibly develop a schedule that maximizes utility. 
Another problematic policy is that of prioritized registration, as it represents a classical 
example of The Matthew Effect (Gladwell, 2011).  In the current system, those students who 
have completed more courses are allowed to register before those who have made less progress.  
Additionally, certain Honors students and student athletes are given priority registration.  There 
is a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence suggesting  that underclassmen are unable to 
make satisfactory academic progress because pre-requisite, core, or lower-division classes are 
full or otherwise unavailable by the time it is their turn to register. 
THE UNDERGRAD’S DILEMMA  18 
 
Mathematically, progress towards graduation can be treated as a Hamiltonian Path Problem 
(Bellman, 1962), an analysis of which makes for a compelling follow-up to this particular thesis.  
Still, an institution’s continued commitment to prioritized registration complicates the issue of 
what the school considers “adequate academic progress,” and ultimately drives down both four- 
and six-year graduation rates.  
Systemic Modifications in the Long Run 
 
This analysis has worked to demonstrate that Bridgewater State University treats course 
offering and student registration from the supply side.  Macroeconomic policy analysis has 
demonstrated that this is not necessarily the best approach to optimizing utility in such complex 
systems as undergraduate course registration (Krugman, 1995).   
 
Effectively, what the University does is provide a supply of courses, provide advising 
resources of questionable consistency and reliability, and expect student demand for said courses 
to accommodate what is being provided.  From its inception, this paper has worked to illustrate 
that the system is far more complicated, and that additional steps can be taken to maximize 
overall utility within the system. 
 
By starting with concrete data regarding student’s academic objectives (gathered from the 
students themselves), an institution can adjust supply to better align it with demand.  
Theoretically, a system designed in such a way can ensure that every consumer gets exactly what 
they want.  This is the simplicity of a planned economic environment, and the implications of 
such a system are as profound as they are elegant.  By considering consumer preferences in 
aggregate, an institution can ensure that realized consumer utility equals (or very nearly equals) 
potential utility.  In macroeconomic terms such a structure would be analogous to a central 
government taking policy action to ensure that Real GDP equals Potential GDP.  This is not a 
foreign ideal in American culture – it is a cornerstone of fiscal and monetary policy in the United 
States.  
 
Conclusion and Author’s Notes 
 
Critics will certainly suggest that this paper’s dismal view of college students as intrinsically 
dim-witted or otherwise incapable.  To the contrary – I acknowledge that college students 
represent the upper quartile of academic attainment in the United States.  As a population, 
however, undergraduates are not tremendously skilled at decision-making, optimization, or 
evaluation of external information.   
 
Detractors will certainly note that Involuntary Equilibrium requires an administrative 
framework verging on the impractical.  Furthermore, as one administrator pointed out, “doesn’t 
this take all the fun out of college?”  While an institution providing planned, rigid, degree 
programs would certainly require more manpower, more robust planning tools, and various 
methods to analyze consumer demand on an ongoing basis, the economic potential for systematic 
improvement is impossible to overlook.  The purpose of this paper was to analyze weaknesses 
within the system and derive policy recommendations from that analysis.  To that end, this 
analysis simply does not support the existing “free-for-all” environment. 
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This is the crux of the Undergrad’s Dilemma.  Does a student continue to own the process of 
course enrollment and risk a less than ideal slate of courses every semester, or do they allow the 
institution to step in and assign them to certain classes?  When coupled with an analysis of game 
theory and information economics, the data does not suggest the existing system of self-
enrollment is the ideal method for delivering consistently optimized outcomes. 
 
That said, the evidence speaks for itself.  According to the White House’s Higher Education 
Scorecard, Bridgewater State has a six year graduate rate presently hovering just over 50 percent 
(WhiteHouse.gov, 2013).  How can we justify the status quo when nearly one out of every two 
students cannot or does not finish a degree within six years?  While students face a variety of 
competing demands for their time (family, work, and social pressures, etc.), this study has 
demonstrated the course selection and registration system – the gateway to degree completion – 
is rife with inefficiency and a source of massive disutility. 
 
Author and Chronicle of Higher Education editor Jeff Selingo rightly points out that since 
World War II, education has held the promise of being the great American equalizer, eliminating 
social strata while engendering individual and societal well-being (2013).  The community and 
the Commonwealth are entitled to a higher education system that is more carefully designed and 
administered, with the specific aim of ensuring student success.  
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